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School Districts Not Bound By

Prior Decision
The California Supreme Court
upheld the appellate court's conclusion that the school district suit
was not barred by the judgment in
Salazar's previous case. The court
determined that when the issue
involves only a question of law, not
a question of fact, a prior judgment
is not determinative if the result is
unjust or if the public interest
dictates relitigation of the issue.
Because the prior decision was
not officially published, no source
of legal authority existed. The result was uncertainty among the
school districts concerning the constitutionality of §39807.5. The
court found that the public interest
of the students, taxpayers, and
school districts mandated that the
issue be resolved to provide uniformity in the school districts. As
support for this conclusion, the
court reasoned that an erroneous
decision in Salazar's case could
deny the school districts revenue
they were statutorily entitled to
raise. Consequently, school districts could be forced to eliminate
transportation if they were unable
to afford it without the revenue
authorized by the statute.
Moreover, in the original action,
evidence of the unconstitutionality
of the statute was presented. However, the school districts, which
were not parties to the action, did
not have an opportunity to defend
the constitutionality of the section.
No Violation of Free School
Guarantee
The California Supreme Court
determined that §39807.5 did not
violate the free school guarantee of
the California Constitution, which
provides for a free school in each
district for at least six months
every year after the first year in
which a school has been established.
The court began its analysis by
attempting to examine the intent
of the framers of the California
Constitution but found little guidance as to whether it was permissible for school districts to charge a
fee for transportation. The court
noted that the framers did not
consider transportation to be a
part of the school system, supportVolume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992

ing the view that transportation
was not part of the free school
guarantee.
Next, the court examined its
own decisions and those of other
states interpreting similar provisions. In doing so, the court adopted the standard from a previous
California case that the free school
guarantee only extends to "necessary elements of any school's activity."
In applying this standard, the
court refused to adopt Salazar's
argument that bus transportation
is a necessary element of any
school's activity. The court's analysis focused on the fact that, without bus transportation, students
were not denied an opportunity to
receive an education. Bus transportation was not an integral part
of the education system; while
transportation may provide convenience for students, the court noted that all students were not required to use the same mode of
transportation.
The court also reasoned that
transportation was not an expense
unique to education, such as textbooks and teachers' salaries. Further, school districts are not required by law to provide bus
transportation for students. Therefore, the court declined to find that
bus transportation was within the
scope of the free school guarantee
of the California Constitution.

ed a child from paying the transportation fee. The court found that
these differences did not necessarily result in a violation of the equal
protection clause.
When a school district provided
transportation without charge, it
was available to all students. In
districts that charged for the transportation, those students who
could not afford it would still have
access to transportation. Therefore, in either case, poor students
would have access to transportation if their school district chose to
provide it.
The Dissenting Opinion
As the lone dissenter, Justice
Mosk concluded that §39807.5 violated the free school guarantee of
the California Constitution. The
reasoning behind his conclusion
was that such fees would threaten
the opportunity for children who
could not afford transportation to
receive an education. He also believed that those who did not meet
the definition of indigent imposed
by the school district still might not
be able to afford transportation,
which could effectively deny students access to an education. In
finding §39807.5 violative of the
free school guarantee clause, he did
not reach the issue of whether it
conflicted with the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.
Barbara L. Gallagher

Section 39807.5 Survives Equal
Protection Analysis

The supreme court further held
that §39807.5 did not facially violate the equal protection clause of
the California Constitution. The
court rejected the argument that
the section discriminated against
poor students by creating a classification based on wealth that affected the fundamental right to education. The court pointed out that
students who are unable to pay the
transportation fees are exempt
from payment under the section.
The supreme court also rejected
the argument that the section promoted inequality in the treatment
of students in different school districts, depending on whether the
district charged for transportation
and how the district determined
the level of indigency that exempt-

Baltimore City Kosher
Laws Require Intent To
Defraud Consumers
And Do Not Violate
Maryland's Constitution
In Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d

841 (Md. 1992), the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that Baltimore City kosher laws, which prohibit fraud in the sale of kosher
products, do not violate the Maryland Constitution. Furthermore,
no individual who sincerely believes his conduct conforms to
kosher requirements can be convicted of violating kosher laws,
(continued on page 134)
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even if his actions consitute a
technical violation.
Background
Kosher food products are prepared in accordance with Orthodox Hebrew rules and dietary laws.
Orthodox Jews buy kosher foods in
order to comply with religious requirements. Other consumers purchase kosher products because they
feel these foods are healthier or of a
higher quality than non-kosher
foods.
In order to ensure that products
marketed as kosher actually comply with the dietary standards set
forth by the Hebrew religion, many
states and municipalities have
adopted kosher laws and ordinances. In Baltimore City, the Bureau
of Kosher Meat and Food Control
("the Bureau") is responsible for
ensuring that food offered for sale
as kosher is, in fact, kosher. Persons who fraudulently market nonkosher food as kosher can be fined
and/or imprisoned.
George Barghout ("Barghout")
owned and operated an establishment called Yogurt Plus in Baltimore City. On September 1, 1989,
the Bureau received a complaint
that Yogurt Plus was violating kosher laws. In response to the complaint, the Bureau sent inspector
Rabbi Kurefeld to Yogurt Plus to
investigate.
Rabbi Kurefeld noticed advertisements for kosher hot dogs both
outside the store and inside on a
menu board. The kosher hot dogs
were not, however, what they purported to be. Although the hot dogs
were kosher when they arrived at
the Yogurt Plus, they were placed
on a rotisserie next to non-kosher
Polish sausage and non-kosher hot
dogs. Grease from the non-kosher
Polish sausages and hot dogs contacted the kosher hot dogs and
stripped them of their kosher status.
Rabbi Kurefeld explained to
Barghout that calling a food product kosher when it did not meet
kosher standards constituted false
advertising. Both Rabbi Kurefeld
and the City Solicitor issued warning letters to Barghout.
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On three subsequent occasions
between October 11 and November 15, 1989, Rabbi Kurefeld returned to Yogurt Plus only to
discover that the offending conditions remained unaltered. A second warning letter was sent, and
finally, Barghout was charged with
violating the kosher ordinance.
On November 15, 1990, a judge
in the District Court of Maryland
for Baltimore City found Barghout
guilty of violating the Baltimore
City ordinance and ordered him to
pay a fine and court costs. Two
months later, Barghout sought a
declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for
the District of Maryland that the
Baltimore City Code violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
Before addressing the federal
constitutional claim, the district
court judge certified two questions
to the state's highest court, the
Maryland Court of Appeals.
Kosher Laws Punish Only Sellers
Who Knowingly Deceive
Consumers
The first question before the
Maryland Court of Appeals was
whether a person who honestly,
albeit incorrectly, believed his conduct conformed to kosher standards could be convicted of violating the Baltimore kosher laws. The
appellate court found that the Baltimore City Council had intended
to punish only those sellers who
knowingly deceived customers into
buying products falsely labeled as
kosher. The ordinance specifically
stated that it applied to acts done
"with intent to defraud." Thus, the
court concluded that the law was
not designed to punish sellers who
honestly but erroneously believed
their products were kosher.
Next, the court focused on the
state of mind required to sustain a
conviction. The court concluded
that there were three potential
states of mind that could constitute
violations of the ordinance. The
seller, with intent to defraud, could
be convicted by representing nonkosher food products as kosher
when: 1) he knew that they were
not kosher; 2) he believed that they
were probably not kosher; or 3) he
did not really know whether or not

they were kosher.
Thus, only sellers who wilfully
engaged in commercial deceit by
making untrue representations
may be found to violate the ordinance; sellers who sincerely believed that their food products met
the kosher requirements would not
be liable.
Kosher Laws Do Not Violate
Maryland's Constitution
The second question before the
Maryland Court of Appeals was
whether the Baltimore City kosher
ordinance violated Maryland's
Constitution.
Barghout argued that the word
kosher was too vague to be enforced. He insisted that sellers, like
himself, were at the mercy of individual inspectors licensed to apply
their own personal standards on
what constitutes kosher or non-kosher food. The court disagreed with
Barghout's interpretation of the
ordinance. Inspectors were given
little discretion and were not responsible for determining guilt. Although the inspectors' personal interpretations of kosher rules played
a role in the determination of
whether a particular product was
kosher, the seller's state of mind
was the critical factor under the
ordinance.
The appellate court also found
that the word kosher was not overly vague. The kosher ordinance
provided that in order to comply
with the law, individuals "must
adhere to and abide by the Orthodox Hebrew religious rules and
regulations and the dietary laws."
The fact that particular foods were
labeled kosher did not mean that
they received a special blessing. In
fact, the food product, in and of
itself, has no religious significance.
A kosher product is simply food
that is fit for consumption according to Jewish dietary laws. It is the
observance of these dietary laws
that involves Jewish religious beliefs.
Although factors that make particular foods fit for consumption
under these dietary laws can be
complex at times, the overwhelming majority of kosher standards
are well-settled. The court emphasized that complexity is not to be
confused with vagueness. A statute
Volume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992
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is not vague if the meaning of the
disputed words can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, dictionaries, or treatises. In this case, many reliable
references were available to instruct individuals about proper
compliance with kosher standards.
Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the word kosher is not vague,
but instead, has a fairly definite
meaning.
Therefore, the ordinance, which
was designed to prevent fraud in
the sale of food products, did not in
any way infringe on either Barghout or his customers' freedom to
practice whatever religion they
chose. The court concluded that
nothing in Baltimore's kosher food
ordinance violated the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the
Maryland Constitution.
Although Barghout also challenged the Baltimore City ordinance under the United States
Constitution, this claim had to be
determined by the federal courts.
Therefore the Maryland Court of
Appeals did not address this issue.
Kalina Tulley

When Customer Gives
Oral Authorization For
Repairs, Mechanic Is
Entitled To Payment
Regardless Of Written
Estimate Requirement
In Clark v. Luepke, 826 P.2d 147
(Wash. 1992), the Supreme Court
of Washington held that a mechanic may collect fees for work performed despite the absence of a
written estimate if such repairs
were authorized by the customer.
The court also found that in the
absence of proof of injury, customers may not assert an action against
mechanics who violated provisions
of the Automotive Repair Act.
Background
Kerry Clark ("Clark") owned a
1978 Jeep with a remanufactured
high performance engine. While
the engine was still under warranty, it seized up, requiring extensive
Volume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992

repairs. Clark took the Jeep to a
garage owned by Rick Luepke
("Luepke") for repairs. Due to the
nature of the engine and the damage, the engine had to be completely taken apart before an estimate of
the repair costs could be made.
Clark gave oral authorization to
make the repairs and did not request a written estimate.
Luepke repaired the engine in a
timely manner and presented a bill
for $2,764 to the insurance company that held the engine warranty.
The insurer refused to pay the bill,
and Luepke then sought payment
from Clark. When Clark failed to
pay, Luepke asserted a mechanic's
lien on the vehicle for six weeks
until Clark paid the entire amount.
Clark subsequently sued in the
Superior Court for Clark County to
recover the money paid Luepke.
After an arbitrator heard the case,
Luepke sought a trial before the
superior court.
The trial court found that
Luepke had violated several provisions of the Automotive Repair
Act ("ARA"), Wash. Rev. Code
§46.71 (1991). First, Luepke failed
to post a sign in his shop informing
customers of their statutory rights.
Moreover, Luepke did not give
Clark the choice of the type of
notice he could request regarding
the price of repairs. The ARA
dictates that customers be given
three options: 1) the right to a
written estimate before any repair
work took place, with a requirement that the customer be contacted if the price exceeded the estimate by more than 10 percent; 2)
the right to allow repairs to begin
but be contacted if the price exceeded a certain amount; or 3) the
right to a complete waiver of a
written estimate. Additionally,
Luepke could not legally assert a
mechanic's lien since he failed to
make a written estimate of the
repairs.
Despite finding the violations of
the ARA, the trial court denied
Clark's recovery. Under current
law, mechanics who violate the
ARA lose their right to a mechanic's lien but not their claim for the
work performed. As a result, the
court determined that Clark was
not entitled to recovery.
The Washington Court of Ap-

peals affirmed the trial court's decision. It employed a restitution
analysis and placed the burden on
Luepke to prove that although he
had violated the ARA, he was
entitled to receive payment. Since
the trial court determined that the
work was reasonable, necessary,
and justified, the appellate court
held that Luepke had met this
burden.
Failure To Provide Written
Estimate Does Not Bar Collection
The Supreme Court of Washington unanimously affirmed the decision of the lower courts. It held
that while Luepke violated the
ARA, the statute no longer precluded a mechanic who failed to
comply with its provisions from
receiving payment. As a result,
Luepke was entitled to payment
since Clark authorized the repairs.
The court noted the significant
effect of the 1982 amendment to
the ARA. In its original form, the
statute required a mechanic to provide the customer with a written
estimate for all repair work over
$50. Failure to furnish a written
estimate prevented the mechanic
from collecting payment, even if
the mechanic had given an oral
estimate or if the customer had
orally authorized the work. However, the 1982 amendment mitigated this potentially harsh result to
the mechanic who failed to give a
written estimate. Under the revised law, mechanics are able to
collect payment for work performed even if they violated the
ARA, presuming that no other
legal principle denies recovery.
The supreme court stated that
the current version of the ARA
allowed the mechanic to collect for
services performed without providing a written estimate, as long
as the customer authorized the
work. The statute only requires a
written estimate or choice of statutory alternatives when either the
bill is estimated to surpass $75 and
the mechanic intends to assert a
mechanic's lien, or the customer
requested a written estimate. The
court explained that the ARA as
amended eliminated the need for a
written estimate in many circumstances unless the mechanic want(continued on page 140)
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